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Abstract 
Following previous research on the significance that social networks have had for 
the economic and social survival of Latin American and Soviet state-employed 
middle classes, this paper explores the role of social networks (connections) on the 
process of privatization and market liberalization of Post-Communist Hungary. 
Based on former academic studies and on field research conducted for several 
months in Budapest, we will try to show that social networks are central 
intermediary structures on which individuals and groups construct solutions that 
allow them to cope with the deficiencies resulting from the formal system. From 
this perspective we will explore the importance of manager’s connections in the first 
period of the Hungarian privatization process known as “spontaneous privatization”.  
Keywords: Social Networks, Privatization, Post-communism, Informal Exchange, 
Reciprocity, Friendship.  
 
Resumen 
A partir de investigaciones previas basadas en la importancia de las redes sociales 
para la supervivencia económica y social de los trabajadores del estado de clase 
media latinoamericanos y soviéticos, el presente artículo explora el rol de las redes 
sociales (conexiones) en el proceso de privatización y liberación del mercado de la 
Hungría Post-Comunista. Basado en anteriores estudios académicos y en el trabajo 
de campo efectuado durante varios meses en Budapest, intentamos mostrar que 
las redes sociales son estructuras centrales intermediarias a través de las cuales los 
individuos y los grupos construyen soluciones que les permiten hacer frente a las 
deficiencias causadas por el sistema formal. Desde esta perspectiva, exploraremos 
la importancia de las conexiones de los gerentes en el primer periodo del proceso 
de privatización húngaro conocido como “privatización espontánea”.  
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Following Adler’s previous work on the relationship between the formal and informal 
spheres in different socioeconomic systems and within different institutional 
frameworks (Adler-Lomnitz 1971, 1977, 1981, 1988, 2000), we have focused on 
the study of social networks as central intermediary structures on which individuals 
and groups construct solutions that allow them to cope with the deficiencies 
resulting from the formal system.3 
Beginning with a study of the Chilean middle class (Adler-Lomnitz 1971) Adler-
Lomnitz described a system of generalized reciprocity based on ego-centered 
networks (contacts) which involved a continuing informal exchange of 
complementary services performed and motivated within an ideology of friendship. 
This system called compadrazgo was interpreted as an expression of class 
solidarity, which was needed for the social survival of the group. Horizontality and 
reciprocity, friendship and trust were its main characteristics features. Thirty years 
later, Barozet (2002) has found that informal exchange of favors is a social practice 
which is still central to the social survival of the middle class in Chile. When the 
exchange of favors is unbalanced, however, the relationship becomes asymmetrical 
and the networks acquire a vertical structure. This is rather clear in political 
systems where informal patron-client relations appear as mechanisms by which 
political officials uses there position in the formal bureaucracy to exchange 
resources for loyalty and votes.  
                                               
3 Sociologist use the term “formal organization” to denote groups of people that engage in social 
practices characterized by explicit and embodied –usually professionally written, ritually accepted, and 
publicly available- rules and regulations. Adherence to, and enforcement of, them is expected of all 
members. Behavior that follows those fixed rules is called formal behavior. All other forms of social 
action –the avoidance or circumventing of regulations- qualify as informal behavior. Informal behavior 
precedes its formal counterpart both historically and among individuals, so most manifestations of 
informality constitute the natural pattern of social life. (Böröcz, 2000, p. 351) 
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Later on, Adler-Lomnitz’s study on the survival of informal workers in a Mexican 
shantytown (Adler-Lomnitz 1977) showed that the physical survival of the group 
was based on the existence of exocentric social networks (tight networks), which 
were described as local knots of high intensity exchange, whose characteristic 
aspect was that exchange is not centered in one individual but practiced by all 
members of that networks alike. Each member of the exocentric network may, at 
the same time, maintain additional dyadic reciprocity relations outside the network, 
but such relations tend to be less intense and less stable than those practiced 
within the exocentric network (Adler-Lomnitz 1977, p.135). This system of 
exchange based on social networks acted as an informal security system that 
ensured survival under the chronic state of insecurity that characterized this 
stratum of the population. Again, horizontality and reciprocity, and in this case, 
kinship and trust were its organizing principles. 
In the same shantytown Adler-Lomnitz recognized that when an individual within 
the horizontal reciprocal network organized some of his kin and friends into a group 
in order to do jobs for the formal sphere of society that required manpower, an 
asymmetrical relation began to develop. Therefore, the horizontal character of the 
reciprocal network modified into a vertical one were individual leaders became 
brokers that articulated the formal employer with peer members of his network, 
thus conforming an action group (Mayer 1968). The permanence, size, and 
stratification of action groups were related to the flow of resources from the formal 
sphere. The larger the flow, the more permanent and stratified was the vertical 
group. If the flow was cut off, the vertical network, which constituted the action 
group, merged back into a horizontal network. Therefore the maintenance of 
horizontal ties was important both as a resource (labor and exchange of favors) and 
as a cushion that provided security once the jobs were finished and resources 
stopped flowing down. These networks based on principles of loyalty and 
redistribution constituted mechanisms of articulation between the informal sector 
and the formal economy. 
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Studying the informal economy in the Soviet Union Adler-Lomnitz (1988) found a 
traditional social institution of exchange (compadrazgo-like) called blat (Ledeneva 
1998). Blat was defined as a system of horizontal exchange of scarce goods and 
services, which allowed coping with the inefficiencies of a centrally planned and 
over-regulated system (Kornai 1992). This traditional institution (Blat) became 
central to solve the problems of scarcity of goods as well as for obtaining jobs and 
services provided by the State. At the same time, another network configuration, 
conformed as action groups based on vertical relations, appeared within the formal 
sphere. As an example, small informal enterprises sprang up within State factories 
producing informally a new set of goods, which entered informally the consumer’s 
market using the factory’s resources, including labor time, tools and raw materials. 
These products were often used by managers to fulfill centrally planned quotas 
assigned to them, and eventually to increase the personal income of managers and 
workers. The illegal and severely punished character of these activities, made them 
extremely dependent on relationships of trust. 
In Hungary, the Stalinist program introduced by the Soviet Union after 1948 
crashed in 1956 being followed by a “post-totalitarian experimentation with an 
enlightened, pragmatic and paternalistic authoritarianism […] popularly known as 
‘goulash communism’. Later on in the sixties and seventies a ‘second informal 
latent society’ independent of the State appeared, with its own organizing principles 
and networks in the hidden informal sphere of social space” (Hankiss 1990, p. 82-
85).  
As part of this development, an informal “second economy” emerged in the areas of 
agricultural production and small shops. Many scholars thought these informal 
family enterprises would be the seed of capitalist development, as they constituted 
a ground for the promotion of private initiative (Gábor 1997, p. 158-151; Szelenyi 
2001). The process of transition to a market economy, however, showed that such 
transformation did not occur as a result of this primitive type of family capitalism 
and small informal businesses, but was the result of changes promoted in part by 
the political changes in the Soviet Union and, latter on, by the technocratic group of 
the Nomenklatura, particularly the managerial elites.4 These individuals by virtue of 
their technical and political knowledge and their networks (social capital) were able 
to propose and launch economic reforms that eventually led to the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises (Voslensky 1978).  
                                               
4 Aquí sería conveniente agradecer a uno de los revisores de este texto quien nos ha hecho notar la 
existencia de un sistema de compadrazgo húngaro llamado "protekció". 
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In the following sections, we will try to analyze the importance of manager’s social 
networks in the first period of the process of privatization (called “spontaneous 
privatization”) in Hungary by which some property owned by the socialist state 
were transformed into private ownership. 
Historical Background 
At the beginning of the sixties the socialist economies were in a profound economic 
crisis. Hungary was not the exception. The countryside production experienced a 
decreasing trend. As a result, in 1963 the Kádár regime dramatically changed its 
course, entering a reform trajectory and implementing transformations more 
consistently than any other country in Central Europe. After years of repression and 
social confrontation that followed the 1956 popular uprising, Kádár and his allies in 
the Communist Party moved towards a policy of concessions and compromises 
(Szelényi, et al., 2001, p. 48). 
Kádár, who had populist tendencies, offered a “deal” to the working class, which 
became known as the New Economic Policies. This deal began in the countryside. 
As Hungary collectivized agriculture in the early 1960s, it also adopted a highly 
flexible policy toward family production (Szelényi, et al., 2001, p. 49). The resulting 
compromise on rural property relations created the practice of micro-plot farming 
activities alongside large-scale state and cooperative farming (Böröcz 1993, p.87). 
This approach to socialized production proved to be so successful that, by the early 
1970s, it was copied by other economic sectors. In industry Hungarians invented 
the equivalent of family plots (or the individual responsible system) by permitting 
complex subcontracting arrangements to grow within state-owned firms. For 
example, if a group of workers wanted to use the company’s machinery, they could 
rent them and produced the same goods in extra-hours. With the second economy, 
workers learned their way around it and started to believe that it offered to them a 
unique opportunity for upward social mobility by providing multi-source income 
earning strategies. 
These concessions constituted the fertile ground within the monolithic system 
where private initiative began to grow. Therefore, the reforms promoted by the 
government made possible for workers to learn how to behave in a capitalist 
economy. This process implied the de-criminalization of the non-state sector and 
the transformation of the Hungarian property structure well before the regime 
political changes had begun. (Böröcz 1993, p.89).   
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Another important feature of the reform promoted by Kádár was the deal with the 
intelligentsia. After Stalin’s death, several socialist bureaucracies had lost their 
legitimacy, which was based on the charisma of the leader and the emphasis on 
class struggle. As a consequence, there was an attempt to regain popularity by 
recruiting educated professionals into positions of power and reinterpreting 
socialism as a “scientific project”. In Hungary the social contract with the 
professional class was carried further, and it was more consistently applied than in 
other socialist countries (Szelényi, et al., 2001, p.49-50). The Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party (MSZMP) was so determined to recruit leaders from among highly 
educated segments of society that it was flexible on the idea that these new cadres 
join the party or express their loyalty to the principles of Marxism. Ironically, this 
flexible attitude toward the technocratic intelligentsia may have unintentionally 
played a role in weakening the legitimacy of the socialist system, as the new 
technocracy that moved into positions of power began to question the socialist 
regime (Péteri 1998, 2002). Eventually this was reinforced by the deep crisis that 
preceded the political transition and the arrival of Glasnot and Perestroika. 
The new technocracy, led by large enterprise managers, placed the idea of property 
reform on the Party’s agenda in the early 1980s. What they presented at this stage 
was not a full-fledged program of privatization, but a simple solution to the 
“property vacuum”5 problem that plagued all socialist economies. It is now clear 
that with this maneuver the technocratic elite began to move the Hungarian 
economy in the direction of capitalism, and enterprise managers began slowly to 
renegotiate their property rights in order to legalize them by extending them 
beyond mere possession, obtaining significant control over what to produce and 
how to invest capital (Böröcz 1992). 
                                               
5 Böröcz (1993) argues that the Soviet-centered Empire was marked by property vacuum as the 
dominant property relation. With the term property vacuum Böröcz describes an unclear definition in the 
allocation of property rights.  
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At first, members of the political bureaucratic “old guard” fought against this 
change, but during the summer of 1989 in the Round Table negotiations that 
signaled the end of the monopoly of Hungary’s Communist Party, they were 
defeated by the new technocracy. From this point onward, the new technocracy 
was free to complete the transformation of property relations in Hungary. But 
rather than simply stimulating the expansion of the second economy, policy makers 
began designing a variety of measures for the privatization of the public sector. In 
a matter of months, legislation was passed to create the legal framework for what 
was called “spontaneous privatization” (Rona-Tas 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998, p. 
58-64). 
Spontaneous privatization 
Forms of spontaneous privatization began in Hungary in 1988 still under the 
socialist regime (Voszka 1996, p.182). For a while, the transformation of individual 
firms from state hands to other proprietors had taken place through loopholes left 
open by two existing pieces of legislation that gave enterprise directors ample room 
for maneuver. The Law of Enterprise Councils (1984) formally transferred some 
ownership functions from ministries to these newly created bodies controlled by 
company management, and the Law on Economic Transformation and the 
Enterprise Law enacted in January and June of 1989, which included provisions for 
establishing joint stock and limited liability companies. This legal measure provided 
the vehicle for “spontaneous privatization” of state enterprises as it placed 
tremendous power in the hands of company management to negotiate and control 
the transfer of assets of state companies to private hands (Rona-Tas 1997, p.171; 
Böröcz 1993; Stark and Bruszt 1998).  
The basic steps in the process were as follows: First, the management of a state-
owned company sets up a large number of affiliates, companies of limited liability. 
Then they transfer all the assets of the state enterprise to the new companies so 
that the management of the first one, not the central state organs, is in charge of 
such assets. In that way the state enterprise becomes a virtual shell because it was 
being reduced to a legal structure without any direct productive assets. In a further 
twist, shares are issued for the affiliates and the value of them is steeply lowered. 
The state-owned company management, their kin and friends buy a substantial 
portion of the affiliate’s shares at such preferential prices and, once the transfer is 
completed, the new owners increase the value of the shares by the same way they 
had been devaluated (Böröcz 1993, p.92-93). In short two mechanisms were used 
by manages to gain ownership rights over productive capital:  
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“In one scenario, managers suppers the price at which stocks in privatized 
state firms are sold, use their social networks to obtain credits from banks, 
and then purchase shares at incredibly discounted prices. In other scenario 
managers establish private satellite companies alongside the firms they 
manage. These private satellites then acquire assets from the state firm in 
exchange for stock in the new company. […] In either case, managers are 
able to acquire significant ownership rights over state assets"   (Hanley, et.al, 
1998, p.13).  
 
A second version of spontaneous privatization saw Hungarian firms entering into 
joint ventures with foreign investors. In this case, management bought only a part 
of the shares, preferably a sufficient number so as to be able to play a balance 
between foreign private owners and the domestic state. This kind of transformation 
put the entire process in the hands of the Enterprise Council, that is, in the hands 
of management. The managers selected the outside investors, usually on terms 
favorable to them, with the condition of maintaining their current positions as local 
managers or gain controlling interests in a profitable venture carved out of the 
original state enterprise. Managers were also responsible of preparing their own 
company valuation. However, the difficulty of determining a fair price left a 
considerable room for maneuver in negotiating such contracts (Voszka 1996). 
According to an interviewee involved in the legislative reforms, the strategies of 
Hungarian managers did not differ from the ones that take place in a capitalist 
country: “this is the same way as in capitalist countries where people with power 
change the rules, making all the changes legal. In Hungary things were done 
following rules, including legal evaluations of how much an enterprise was worth, 
although those evaluations were in general very low, and therefore the small 
groups of managers could buy an enterprise or even receive a loan from a bank 
which later on they paid”. 
Fogarassy and Szántó illustrate manager’s strategies by describing the privatization 
of a large enterprise. In this case, the authors show that the strategic interactions 
among top leaders influenced the process and outcome of privatization (2001, p. 
92-103). On the one hand they may impede the initiative of the employees to 
acquire part ownership, and on the other, they may make things easy for the 
potential new owner in order to retain their positions.  
Most of the literature on Hungary transformation suggests that the key actors in 
the process of “spontaneous privatization” were the managers of state-owned 
enterprises. In virtually all transactions whereby state assets were transferred to 
private owner, symmetrical horizontal networks determined the process. 
Without involving government organizations, managers of enterprises and 
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occasionally foreign investors made decisions about the sale of state enterprises 
and assets. Bargaining involved clearly defined exchanges of favors among relatives 
and friends (Volska 1996; Albert and David 2000, p. 247-253). 
The high incidence of hidden, informal transactions between managers in the 
reallocation of property relations concerning state assets through post-state-
socialist property change indicate the importance of widespread and often very 
complicated systems of favors and tricks, privileges and exclusions, information 
leaks and deception. As Böröcz points out:  
Former state-socialist managers’ informal social networks became such a 
crucial feature of the transformation that the structure of their informal ties 
has determined not only personnel selection, i.e., who will occupy top 
managerial and proprietarial positions in Hungary’s post-state-socialist 
capitalism, but also the shape of the economic organization. Not only have 
former state-socialist managers shown tremendous resilience in the face of 
various pressures for their removal, even the changing company structures 
came to mirror the patterns of the networks endowments of their top 
managers at the time of the transformation (2000, p. 351). 
Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley proposed in their book Making Capitalism Without 
Capitalists that the process of transformation of the Hungarian socialist regime was 
the result of something parallel to a managerial revolution in the West, where 
managers, not individual capitalists, became the new power bloc. According to the 
authors, only the former socialist technocrats who had social and cultural capital, 
that is, social networks, knowledge, information, expertise and the capacity to 
manipulate symbols, retained their positions in the post-communist transformation. 
If they possessed only political capital they lost their privilege, power, and prestige 
(1998, p.13). In the same vein, Böröcz suggests that “whom you knew in the ever 
more complex institutional maze of the Hungarian economy made all the difference 
in your ability to control the process. Manager’s cliques and coalitions, formed 
during the preceding ten years were now perfectly well suited to become 
instruments to manipulate all elements of the transformation. Because the 
transformation involved the demolition and rewriting of the inherited legal and 
political structures, the rent extracted in the transformation by this group of 
managers was primarily not derived from political or even administrative position 
per se. It emerged mainly from informal social assets” (Szelényi, et al., 2001, p. 
49-50).  
How did manager’s social networks become the seed of private enterprises and 
economic profit? We might characterize the evolution of manager’s social networks 
in the following way. Before the transition, types of generalized reciprocity as 
described for the Chilean case, in which ego-centered horizontal networks were the 
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basis for reciprocal exchanges of scarce resources. This informal system provided a 
wide net of solidarity. At some point, within an ego-centered network, narrower 
exocentric networks (tight networks) began to concentrate based on stronger levels 
of interpersonal trust where reciprocal exchanges occurred regularly. Eventually 
from these narrower networks and through the action of individual leaders a 
different type of vertical social network began to develop forming “action groups”, 
which might become, as in the case of managers, small enterprises.6 (Völker 1995). 
In Hungary, managers recruited members of both their exocentric, as well as 
acquaintances of their ego-centered networks, including family and friends, to 
whom they could trust, and who had special knowledge or connections useful for 
their new economic endeavors (Albert and David 2000, p. 247-253; Kuczi and Makó 
1997; Utasi 1996). The formal network capital of post-communist managers was 
based on positions in professional associations, on board of directors and 
supervisory boards, especially economist who were positioned in different advisory 
posts. During the brief transitional period when informal spontaneous privatization 
took place, a manager could organize an “action group” by recruiting members of 
his networks who possessed technical knowledge as well as valuable social 
connections (Bartha and Martin 1998, p.235). 
The new entrepreneurial class was then the people that had cultural and social 
capital. As a Hungarian informant told us: “the winners of the transition were 
individuals, who knew how things worked from the inside, mainly those who worked 
in the financial sector”. According to this informed individual, the connections and 
contacts of managers were not necessarily based on kinship relations but more 
often on relations acquired when they were members of the Communist Party, at 
work and in sport groups. In these contexts, groups of men would, for example, go 
out to hunt for several days during which they ate, drank and joked together 
strengthening their social networks: “most of the successful commercial leaders 
around 50 years old were entrenched in the Communist Party networks”. 
                                               
6 In her study on social networks in East Germany, Völker (1995) found that under communism the 
problems for every citizen were: how to guarantee individuality and trustworthiness of others, and how 
to obtain goods in short supply. To solve these problems people had two types of networks: niches, that 
is, a small group related by strong ties that were composed by people with whom one could talk about 
their own personal situations and discuss political events; and a large net of instrumental weak ties that 
served as provision networks. During the transition both parts of the network changed somewhat, 
provision networks became ties important for information and advice in financial matters; on the other 
hand, niches, became less important for their former function as freedom of political opinions was less 
controlled. Therefore, the differences between them and the weak ties became minuscule. 
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Another situation where meaningful social networks were built up was the 
diplomatic career: “If you wanted to be a diplomat you had to take a course in the 
USSR where there was a specialized school. During that period, the future 
diplomats were organized in aged-groups, lived in the same dormitories, went 
together to drink vodka, hung out and had a good time”. The connections between 
Hungarians and foreigners who went to this school are still used: “for instance, if a 
politician lost his job in the transition period he could look for one of his old close 
comrade who was well located in a large enterprise. In a social gathering, while 
drinking and eating, he could complain: ‘I used to be a cadre, a member of the 
Nomenklatura, but now I lost my political job, how I am going to maintain my 
family?’, and his friend might say: ‘don’t worry, as you have contacts with the 
Russians, I will put you in charge of the oil imports from Russia to Hungary…. We 
have been together for many years and we trust each other’”. 
Ganev (2001) exemplified the dynamics of manager’s social networks during the 
transition in Bulgaria through the analysis of Multigroup, the strongest economic 
conglomerate after 1989. The logic of Multigroup enrichment is the logic of the 
state’s impoverishment. The dynamic, which propelled this enterprise to the highest 
peaks of economic and political power, was redirecting the flow of resources from a 
circuit operating within the confines of "state-run institutions" to a more open-
ended cycle with several "privatized" companies. This was possible because 
Multigroup’s high-ranking officials relied exclusively on the expertise of former 
communist state officials who had occupied various sensitive positions within the 
communist state and who knew “how things work”. Its president was married to the 
daughter of the director of Military Counter Intelligence, which gave him access to 
networks comprised of secret service officials and other insiders from the state 
administration. The vice-presidents and general directors of the expanded 
conglomerate were all former heads of the most powerful department of State 
Security as well as heads of strategic departments of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, which included the department of Information and Analysis. Others were 
former directors of state-owned enterprises (oil industry, industrial investment and 
micro-processing) and eight more were former deputy-ministers who served under 
the ancient regime. In other words, Multigroup created an environment in which 
"stored knowledge" about the Bulgarian economy was transformed into economic 
profit. The biography of Multigroup’s strongmen suggests that it is the ways in 
which individuals are “connected” to networks which control information and access 
to different resources that really matters when it comes to comprehending the 
dynamic of “economic reforms”- their personal, cultural, religious, ethnic and 
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psychological predispositions may be considered as spuriously significant attributes 
(Ganev 2001).  
Conclusions 
Accepting Karl Polanyi´s statement, that economic action is embedded in social 
relations, we intended to study in this paper the importance of social networks in 
the process of transition from a centralized communist society to a capitalist market 
economy.  
Under the communist regime, social networks acted as intermediary structures, 
which allowed individuals and groups to cope with the deficiencies resulting from 
the formal system. People maintained ego-centered relations through which, they 
exchanged scare goods and services. At the same time, they relied on compact 
exocentric networks composed of relatives, friends and colleagues, with whom they 
could exchange scare resources, and also discuss personal and political matters.  
Manager’s exocentric networks better informed of what was going on in the 
communist world, exchanged vital information on the new direction that the 
economy and the political system were taking, before they were common 
knowledge. These exocentric networks began to evolve into vertical action groups 
that promoted legal and property reforms, which eventually, allowed them to have 
a greater control of the state’s assets. By creating limited liability and joint stock 
companies, enterprise management was able to transform state-owned firms into 
private companies that were left in hands of their close social network. During this 
process that was called “spontaneous privatization”, managers regarded the 
extension of their social networks as the principal condition of development. Social 
networks thus operated as one of the mechanisms by which non-economic assets -
expertise, practical knowledge, and most important, informal network assets- were 
converted into ever more decisive control and ownership.  
As a result, the transformation of the ownership structure of Hungary, at least in 
the first phase of property change was not realized in the formal sphere, but on the 
contrary, it involved the rampant, wholesale informalization of virtually all assets of 
the economy (Böröcz 1993). After the political transformation took place, the 
processes of privatization was centralized in the hands of the State Property Agency 
founded in 1990. However, almost irrespective of the presence or absence of the 
state’s formal institutions or regulations, the informal relationships still determined 
–to large degree- the processes of market liberalization. 
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